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TREATMENT OF DUMPED IMPORTS FROM NONMARKET
ECONOMY COUNTRIES
JOSEPH P. HORNYAK*
With the decline of communism in Eastern Europe, the United
States treatment of imports from Eastern European countries becomes
increasingly significant. The success of the new governments in these
countries depends, in large part, on their ability to revive their coun-
tries' dormant economies. Access to the U.S. markets will play an im-
portant role in these emerging economies. Currently, most communist
countries are classified as "nonmarket economy countries" by the De-
partment of Commerce and many of their imports to the U.S. are sub-
ject to U.S. anti-dumping duties.' The duties effectively raise the U.S.
price for the dumped merchandise because the duties are an additional
cost the importer must pay to bring the merchandise to market.'
Import duties are especially harmful to goods imported from com-
munist countries. Often, these goods must be priced below market
levels because there is a perception on the part of American consumers
that goods from communist countries are of inferior quality.3 More-
over, some consumers choose not to purchase goods from communist
countries for political reasons." In addition, the Court of Appeals for
the Federal Circuit has recently held that the countervailing duty laws
do not apply to nonmarket economy nations. 5 Thus, the antidumping
* The author is an associate at the Washington, D.C. office of Piper & Marbury.
1. The Department of Commerce has determined that the following countries
have nonmarket economies: Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Hungary, Poland, the Peo-
ple's Republic of China, Romania and the Union of the Soviet Socialist Republics. See
generally, Continental Steel Corp. v. United States, 614 F. Supp. 548, 549 (Ct. Int'l
Trade 1985).
2. In the case of menthol from the People's Republic of China, imports fell
"precipitously" after the initial determination of a 13% dumping margin. See Alford,
When is China Paraguay? An Examination of the Application of the Antidumping
and Countervailing Duty Laws of the United States to China and Other "Nonmarket
Economy" Nations, 61 S. CAL. L. REv. 79, 88 (1987) [hereinafter Alford].
3. Id. at 92-93.
4. Id.
5. Georgetown Steel Corp. v. United States, 801 F.2d 1308 (Fed. Cir. 1986).
Generally, the countervailing duty laws are designed to offset any unfair competitive
advantage foreign producers attain from certain types of governmental subsidies. Ge-
orgetown Steel, 801 F.2d at 1315. In Georgetown Steel, the court noted that unfair
competition which necessitates countervailing duty laws does not exist in nonmarket
economies due to state controls. Id. at 1315. According to the court, Congress created a
special method for determining whether imports from nonmarket economies were being
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law is now the principal means for combatting unfair trade practices
from such nations.
Part I of this paper provides a brief overview of the U.S. an-
tidumping law. In Part II, the paper discusses the practical effect of
determining that a country has a nonmarket economy or state-con-
trolled economy. Part II also comments on the fairness of enforcement
of the antidumping law against these countries. In Part III, the paper
focuses on the statutory and regulatory provisions that define a
nonmarket economy country and discusses the U.S. Department of
Commerce's ("DOC") treatment of past attempts at reform in state-
controlled economies. Part III also comments on the present state of
reforms in communist countries as they relate to nonmarket economy
status under the antidumping law.
I. OVERVIEW OF THE ANTIDUMPING LAWS
A. Background
The antidumping law is provided by Title I of the Trade Agree-
ments Act of 1979,6 which implements the Tokyo Round Multilateral
Trade agreements on dumping.7 It supersedes the Antidumping Act of
1921.8 The antidumping law is intended to protect U.S. industry from
unfair price discrimination in the form of predatory pricing by foreign
producers. 9 Generally, it imposes an antidumping duty on foreign mer-
chandise sold in the U.S. at "less than fair value" if, by reason of those
sales, a U.S. industry is "materially injured" or "threatened with ma-
terial injury. '"10 The duty is "the amount by which the foreign market
dumped while establishing no such method with respect to the countervailing duty
laws. Id. at 1316. Ultimately, the court deferred to Congress' conclusion that the only
way to protect "the American market against selling by nonmarket economies at un-
reasonably low prices is through the antidumping law." Id. at 1318.
6. Pub. L. No. 96-39, §§ 101-107, 93 Stat. 144 (1979), as amended by the Trade
and Tariff Act of 1984, Pub. L. No 98-573, §§ 602-605, 609, 612, 98 Stat. 2948
(1984) and by the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-
418, §§1316, 1317, 1327, 1328, 1330, 102 Stat. 1107 (1988) (codified at 19 U.S.C. 99
1673 - 1677k).
7. See S. REP. No. 249, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 2, reprinted in 1979 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 381, 387. Congress clearly provided that the Tokyo Round
accords on dumping are to be disregarded to the extent that they are inconsistent with
the U.S. antidumping statute. See 19 U.S.C. § 2504(a).
8. Ch. 14, 42 Stat. 11 (1921), repealed by Trade Agreements Act of 1979, Pub.
L. No. 96-39, § 106(a), 93 Stat. 144, 193.
9. U.S.X. Corp. v. United States, 682 F. Supp. 60, 65 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1988).
10. 19 U.S.C. §1673 (1988).
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value exceeds the United States price for the merchandise."'" After an
initial determination by the DOC, the importer must post a bond equal
to the dumping margin. Once the DOC issues a final order, the im-
porter must deposit cash with the U.S. Customs Service.
The U.S. producer usually initiates an investigation by filing a pe-
tition with the administering authority. 2 There are two basic elements
of an antidumping investigation: (1) a determination by the Interna-
tional Trade Commission ("ITC") that certain dumped imports cause
or threaten to cause "material injury to a U.S. industry," and (2) a
determination by the DOC that certain "foreign merchandise is being,
or is likely to be sold in the United States at less than its fair value
"13
B. Material Injury to a U.S. Industry
In making a determination that there is "material injury" to a
U.S. industry, the ITC is required to consider: (1) the volume of im-
ports of the merchandise which is the subject of the investigation; (2)
the effect of imports of that merchandise on prices in the United States
for like products; and (3) the impact of imports of such merchandise on
domestic producers of like products, limited to production operations
within the United States."
The ITC may also consider any economic factors it deems rele-
vant.15 The analysis for material injury is the same for nonmarket
economies as it is for market economies. Thus, a less than fair value
determination alone does not result in the assessment of a duty.'6 In
addition, since volume is an important consideration, a nonmarket
economy country must export sufficient quantities of a particular prod-
11. id.
12. 19 U.S.C. §1673a(b)(1) (1988).
13. 19 U.S.C. § 1673 (1988).
14. 19 U.S.C. § 1677(7)(B)(i) (1988).
15. 19 U.S.C. § 1677(7)(B)(ii) (1988).
16. An example of this is the case of menthol imported from the People's Repub-
lic of China (PRC). After an extensive investigation of the PRC's economy, the DOC
determined that menthol from the PRC was being sold in the U.S. at less than fair
value. The DOC ordered the U.S. Customs Service to suspend liquidation of Chinese
menthol pending a final determination. After the Chinese importers posted a bond
equal to 13.5% of the product's freight-on-board value, as required by the law, the
ITC found that these imports had neither caused nor threatened material injury to a
U.S. industry. Thus, the DOC terminated its investigation. See Menthol from the Peo-
ple's Republic of China: Determination of the Commission in Investigation No. 731-
TA-28 (final), USITC Publication 1151, June, 1981.
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uct before it will be assessed an antidumping duty. 7
C. Less Than Fair Value
Less than fair value is the difference between the U.S. price and
the "fair value" of the merchandise. "Fair value" is essentially the
same as the "foreign market value" ("FMV").' 8 The statute and regu-
lations provide three methods of determining the foreign market value
in a market economy country. First, the preferred FMV is the price
charged by the foreign producer in its domestic market (the "home
market"). Second, where there are insufficient sales of such merchan-
dise in the home market to form an adequate basis for comparison, 9
FMV is the price at which the goods are sold for export to a third
country or countries. 20 Ideally, the third country or countries selected
for comparison should have markets organized similarly to the U.S.
market. There should also be a sufficient volume of exports to the third
country.2 1 Finally, FMV may be the constructed value based on prices
of inputs, including labor and materials, general expenses and usual
profit. 12
The U.S. price is the price of the merchandise to the U.S. buyer
and is calculated by one of two methods: (1) the purchase price or (2)
the exporter's sales price. The purchase price is the price at which the
merchandise is purchased or agreed to be purchased before importing
into the United States. 23 This is the price between the producer and
17. For purposes of determining material injury to a U.S. industry, the ITC is
required to assess cumulatively the price and volume effects of imports from other
countries subject to antidumping and countervailing duty investigations. Bingham &
Taylor Division, VA Industries v. United States, 815 F.2d 1482, 1485 (Fed. Cir. 1987).
Therefore, imports from nonmarket economy nations may be grouped with similar im-
ports from other nations for purposes of determining injury to a U.S. industry.
18. 19 C.F.R. § 353.42(a) (1990). The terms "fair value" and "foreign market
value" have essentially the same meaning under the statutory scheme. The reason for
the difference is that "fair value" is used during the investigation as an estimate of
foreign market value. Congress felt that this term would provide the DOC with greater
flexibility in administering the law. H.R. REP. No. 96-137, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 59
(1979). Once the DOC makes a final determination, the foreign market value is used to
calculate the actual amount of the antidumping duty.
19. Sales in the home market are normally considered inadequate to form a basis
for comparison if home market sales are less than five percent of the amount sold to
third countries. 19 C.F.R. § 353.48(a) (1990).
20. Id.
21. 19 C.F.R. § 353.49(b) (1990).
22. The amount added for profit is the amount "usually reflected in sales of the
same class or kind as the merchandise . . ." 19 C.F.R. § 353.50(a)(2) (1990).
23. 19 U.S.C. § 1677a(b) (1988); 19 C.F.R. § 353.41(b) (1990).
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reseller or unrelated middleman in the home market prior to export to
the U.S. The DOC prefers to use the purchase price as the U.S. price
because there are fewer adjustments when comparing it to the FMV. It
is used whenever the merchandise has been sold to an unrelated U.S.
buyer. When a buyer who is unrelated to the producer sells merchan-
dise, 4 the exporter's sale price is Used. This is the price at which the
merchandise is sold in the U.S.
Both the FMV and the U.S. price are subject to certain adjust-
ments "in an attempt to reconstruct the price at a specific 'common'
point in the chain of commerce, so that the prices can be fairly com-
pared on an equivalent basis."25 Generally, the U.S. price is increased
by packing costs, 2 6 import duties of the home country not paid or re-
bated, taxes not paid because of exporting where such taxes would have
been payable if sold at home, and U.S. countervailing duties. 7 The
U.S. price is reduced by U.S. import duties, freight incurred in import-
ing and any export taxes. 28 There are additional deductions from the
U.S. price if the exporter's sales price is used because it is further
along in the chain of distribution than the purchase price. These addi-
tional deductions include commissions and expenses for selling the mer-
chandise in the U.S. as well as any increased value from manufacturing
and assembly in the U.S. after importing. 9 The purpose of these ad-
justments is to eliminate any other factors that would account for the
difference between the U.S. price and the FMV. In short, the statute
and regulations employ various complex and often cumbersome meth-
ods of calculating a dumping margin based on the difference between
the U.S. price and the price at which the merchandise should have
been sold if it were not being dumped.
II. NONMARKET ECONOMY DETERMINATION
A. Effect on Antidumping Duty
Generally, a determination that merchandise is produced in a
24. This includes agents of the exporter, persons controlled either directly or indi-
rectly by the exporter and persons who directly or indirectly control the exporter. 19
U.S.C. § 1677(13) (1988).
25. Smith-Corona Group v. United States, 713 F.2d 1568, 1571-72 (Fed. Cir.
1983).
26. Packing costs are also added to FMV so if identical to the U.S. price, no
adjustments are made. See, e.g., 19 C.F.R. § 353.46(a)(i) (1990).
27. 19 C.F.R. § 353.41(d)(1) (1990).
28. Id. at § 353.41(d)(2).
29. Id. at § 353.41(e).
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nonmarket economy country affects the method used to calculate for-
eign market value. As explained above, the general rule for market
economy nations is that the DOC prefers to use the price in the home
market to determine whether sales are being made at less than fair
value. In the case of a nonmarket economy, the DOC presumes the
home market price to be a price fixed by the government and not sub-
ject to market forces. Consequently, home market prices in a
nonmarket economy country are never used to calculate dumping
margins.
Prior to the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988
("the 1988 Act"),3" if a country were determined to be a state con-
trolled economy, foreign market value was calculated in one of two
ways. The preferred method of determining FMV in these cases was on
the basis of prices of the same or similar merchandise produced in a
non-state-controlled economy country in its home market or for export
to other countries. 31 For the purpose of comparison, the DOC would
attempt to select a non-state-controlled economy country at a stage of
economic development comparable to that of a state-controlled econ-
omy country under investigation. 2 If there were insufficient sales in a
non-state-controlled economy or if there were insufficient data available
concerning such sales, the constructed value method would be used.33
Section 1316 of the 1988 Act significantly changes the method
used to calculate FMV for imports from nonmarket economies. If the
merchandise under investigation is exported from a nonmarket econ-
omy country and available information does not permit calculation of
FMV based on home market values, which is almost always the case,
FMV is calculated based on the "factors of production utilized in pro-
ducing the merchandise.1 34 The factors of production are the hours of
labor required, the quantities of raw materials employed, the amounts
of energy and other utilities consumed, and representative capital cost,
including depreciation.35 Included in the calculation is an amount for
general expenses and profit plus the cost of containers, coverings, and
30. Pub. L. No. 100-418, 102 Stat. 1107, 1186-1189 (1988).
31. 19 U.S.C. § 1677b(c)(1) (1930) (amended by the Omnibus Trade and Com-
petitiveness Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-418, § 1316(a)); 19 C.F.R. § 353.52(a)
(1990).
32. 19 C.F.R. § 353.52(b)(1) (1990).
33. See Unrefined Montan Wax From East Germany, 46 Fed. Reg. 38,555
(1981).
34. 19 U.S.C. § 1677b(c)(1)(B) (1988).
35. Id. at § 1677b(c)(3).
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other expenses as used in the calculation of a constructed value.36 In
valuing the factors of production, the DOC is to use, "to the extent
possible," the prices or costs of factors of production in market econ-
omy countries that are at a stage of economic development comparable
to the nonmarket economy country and who are "significant producers
of comparable merchandise. '3 7 If the DOC cannot acquire sufficient
information to value the merchandise using the factors of production
method, FMV is calculated on the basis of prices in other countries
(including the United States) of similar merchandise produced in mar-
ket economy countries at a level of economic development comparable
to that of the country under investigation.3 8
The difference between the "factors of production" method in the
1988 Act and the "constructed value" method of section 1677(b)(e) is
not altogether clear. Both methods attempt to calculate fair market
value without regard to actual prices charged for the merchandise
under investigation. In other words, both methods attempt to calculate
the price that should or would have been charged if the producer had
not engaged in dumping. Even prior to the 1988 Act, the DOC would
construct FMV based on the "factors of production." For instance, in
Chloropicrin from the People's Republic of China,9 the DOC con-
structed the value of chloropicrin from China based on the prices of the
"factors of production" in India. The DOC valued the raw materials,
labor, energy and factory overhead of several chemical companies in
India. In short, the "factors of production" method set forth in the
1988 Act appears to be a codification of existing practice. The signifi-
cance of the 1988 Act's changes is that the factors of production
method is not the preferred method of calculating FMV for imports
from nonmarket economy countries. The factors of production method
is particularly harmful to nonmarket economy producers because it
eliminates any comparative advantage producers may have over com-
peting producers in a market economy nation. The dumping margin is
inflated because the inputs, or factors of production, are valued at
prices in a market economy country where they are presumably used
more efficiently. This point is best illustrated by the use of labor. Under
36. Id. at § 1677b(c)(1).
37. Id. at § 1677b(d). In valuing the factors of production, the DOC uses infor-
mation generally available at the time rather than using information obtained through
a new investigation. The DOC should not use prices which it suspects may be dumped
or subsidized prices. See, H. CONF. REP. No. 576, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 590-91
(1988), reprinted in 1988 U.S. CODE & ADMIN. NEWS 1612, 1623-1624.
38. 19 U.S.C. § 1677b(c)(2) (1988).
39. 49 Fed. Reg. 5,982 (1984).
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the factors of production method, the DOC calculates the number of
hours of labor used in producing -the merchandise by the nonmarket
economy producer and then multiplies that number by a wage rate
from a market economy country. Since nonmarket economy countries
are often technologically inferior, production is more labor intensive.
Thus, it usually takes more hours to produce a single unit in a
nonmarket economy country than in a market economy. However, be-
cause of organized unions and more advanced job skills, wage rates
tend to be higher in market economy countries. Under the factors of
production method, the value of labor to the producer is artificially in-
flated. For instance, in Urea from the Socialist Republic or
Romania,' the DOC used the wage rates in the United Kingdom to
construct the price of Urea from Romania. This effectively negated the
Romanian producer's advantage from the use of cheaper labor, without
considering the fact that Romanian workers are probably less efficient
than those in the U.K.
The comparative advantage of a nonmarket economy producer
may also be lost in the selection of a surrogate country. In Shop Tow-
els of Cotton from the People's Republic of China,41 the DOC used
Indonesian wage rates in valuing the factors of production of shop tow-
els from the PRC. However, the World Bank has calculated Indone-
sia's 1983 GNP to be twice that of China's. As one commentator
noted:
Although both [Indonesia and China] are developing countries,
a difference of nearly 100 percent in this basic economic indica-
tor is likely to reflect a major difference in wages. By using the
labor cost of a surrogate country with twice its per capita GNP,
China's comparative advantage in labor costs is simply
dissipated.4 2
In this case, the use of the Indonesian values resulted in a 38.8 percent
dumping margin.43
The valuation of energy also illustrates the comparative advantage
problem of the factors of production method. If machinery and equip-
ment in nonmarket economy countries are generally less efficient, they
will consume more energy than comparable machinery and equipment
40. 52 Fed. Reg. 19,553 (1987).
41. 48 Fed. Reg. 12,764 (1983).
42. Neeley, Nonmarket Economy Import Regulation: From Bad to Worse, 20
LAW & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 529, 544 (1989) [hereinafter Neeley].
43. 48 Fed. Reg. 37,055 (1983).
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in market economy countries. Nevertheless, the producers will be
deemed to have paid the energy prices in market economy countries.
Even if a different type of energy is used in production, the DOC will
base the price of this input on an amount of another type of energy
source with the same calorific value."' Thus, producers in nonmarket
economy countries cannot benefit from any advantage they may have in
terms of domestic energy supplies. For example, in Urea from the
U.S.S.R.,' 8 the DOC based the factors of production for natural gas in
the U.S.S.R. on prices in the United Kingdom."' Using the U.K.'s price
for natural gas effectively offset the U.S.S.R.'s advantage due to its
vast reserves of natural gas.
Another problem with the factors of production method is allocat-
ing the factors of production to the merchandise under investigation.
For example, in Chemical Products Corp. v. United States,"7 a foreign
producer in the PRC manufactured two products at the same plant,
HSG and barium carbonate. Only barium carbonate was under investi-
gation. The DOC apportioned the factors of production between bar-
ium carbonate and HSG based on the relative quantities produced at
the plant. The court held that DOC was required to ascertain the mar-
ket value of HSG and allocate the factors of production "to reflect the
differences in the value of the two products."' 8 The court noted that
"[i]t is not reasonable to allocate factors of production between barium
carbonate and HSG on a quantity basis if the value of one product is
significantly greater than the other."' 9 Chemical Products illustrates
44. See Chemical Products Corp. v. United States, 650 F. Supp. 178, 181-2 (Ct.
Int'l Trade 1986).
45. 52 Fed. Reg. 19,557 (1987).
46. Id. at 19,558. U.K. natural gas prices at the time of the investigation were
linked to a rate called the "F price." This is a price set by the gas board in the Nether-
lands and category "F" is the established price for large industrial users throughout
Europe. The DOC stated that the "F price represents the most accurate, verifiable gas
price for the fertilizer sector in the U.K." Id.
47. 645 F. Supp. 289 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1986).
48. Id. at 297.
49. In the case of barium carbonate, the DOC could have used the home market
prices in Mexico as a basis for FMV. In fact, the DOC obtained home market price
data and other information required to calculate FMV. However, the DOC ultimately
determined "Mexico not to be a suitable surrogate ... because it is not at a stage of
economic development comparable to the PRC." 49 Fed.Reg. 33,913, 33,915 (1984).
The court quoted a DOC economist who stated, "Mexico's per capita GNP is more
than seven times that to China's (US $2,090 v. $290). 64% of Mexico's labor force is
engaged in the industrial and service sectors of the economy, with only 36% still in
agriculture. By contrast, 71% of China's labor force is employed in the agricultural
sector, with only 29 % in industry and service. 67 % of Mexico's total population resides
19911
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an inherent problem in the factors of production method in its applica-
tion of market-oriented decision making principles to nonmarket coun-
tries. The court assumed that the managers of the plant in question
would allocate the factors of production to the more valuable product.
However, without a profit incentive, the managers would not have con-
sidered the relative market values of the two products in allocating
resources.
The statute attempts to minimize the harsh effects of the factors of
production method by requiring the DOC to select a surrogate country
"at a level of economic development" comparable to that of the
nonmarket economy country for purposes of valuing the factors.50 How-
ever, the 1988 Act also requires the DOC to use a "significant pro-
ducer" of comparable merchandise. 51 Thus, smaller nonmarket econ-
omy countries may still be deemed to have paid the higher wage rates
of more advanced producers. In short, use of the factors of production
method results in a higher FMV and consequently a higher dumping
margin. This may imply that Congress designed the antidumping law
to effectively punish communist countries for their lack of adherence to
market principles. 52 As one commentator stated, the present law cre-
ates "situations in which the United States, as a market economy na-
tion, seeks to remedy a trade problem with a nonmarket economy coun-
try by imposing a nonmarket solution, even though the regulated
behavior may be common to both market and nonmarket nations. 53
Using the factors of production method, countries whose goods threaten
U.S. industries must pay sizable dumping duties. Consequently, such
products are less likely to enter U.S. markets. 54
in urban areas, while only 13 % of China's total population does." 645 F. Supp. at 292-
3. It is not clear what any of this has to do with the price of barium carbonate in
China.
50. 19 U.S.C. § 1677b(c)(4)(A) (1988).
51. 19 U.S.C. § 1677b(c)(4)(B) (1988).
52. At least one court has recognized that the antidumping statute generally is
intended to be remedial and not punitive. Badger-Powhatan, Div. of Faggie Interna-
tional v. U.S., 608 F. Supp. 653 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1985). This official "remedial" pur-
pose was probably necessary for diplomatic and political reasons. However, politically,
Congress could probably afford to design the antidumping statute to be punitive with
respect to communist countries.
53. Alford, supra note 2, at 99-100 (1987).
54. In the Chinese menthol case, after the initial determination of a dumping
margin equal to 13.5% of the f.o.b. value, Chinese exports of natural menthol to the
U.S. fell "precipitously." See Alford, supra note 2, at 88.
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B. Fairness Considerations
Whether or not Congress intended to punish communist countries
by limiting their ability to compete effectively in the U.S. market, the
antidumping law is often criticized as being protectionist and unfair.
One analyst observed that the 1988 amendments to the antidumping
laws "have not helped clarify or otherwise define what could be objec-
tively called unfair. And they have further tilted the playing field
against respondents and foreign exporters under the guise of leveling
that playing field."55 But before passing judgment on the fairness of the
antidumping law, it is necessary to examine the economic phenomenon
of dumping. As applied to nonmarket economy nations, antidumping
law combats what could objectively be called unfair trade.
"Dumping" has been described as "the sale of commodities in a
foreign market at a price which is lower than the price or value of
comparable commodities in the country of their origin."'56 The purpose
of the antidumping law is to protect U.S. industries from this unfair
price discrimination which is manifested in the form of predatory pric-
ing by foreign producers.5 7
Predatory pricing and price discrimination are generally consid-
ered to be "unfair trade practices." Effective enforcement of the U.S.
antitrust laws could eliminate these practices. 8 Nevertheless, domestic
industries have been unsuccessful in establishing predatory pricing and
price discrimination by foreign producers under the antitrust laws.
Their failure in this regard is primarily due to the absence of any pred-
atory intent on the part of the foreign producers.59 There is usually no
intent to dump because, as most commentators agree, evidence of pred-
atory dumping is indicative of irrational economic behavior. Such a
scheme presupposes that the producer is willing to incur substantial
55. Cameron & Crawford, An Overview of the Antidumpinq and Countervailing
Duty Amendments: A New Protectionism?, 20 LAW & POL'v INT'L Bus. 471, 499
(1989). The authors refer to the 1988 Act as a "special interest" statute because it is
"a response to the particular circumstances arising in individual cases." They conclude
that the Act, by codifying existing practice, may "facilitate protectionism." Id. at 471-
72.
56. Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Electronic Industrial Co., 494 F. Supp.
1190, 1194 (E.D.Pa. 1980).
57. U.S.X. Corp. v. U.S., 682 F. Supp. 60, 65 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1988).
58. The antitrust laws have jurisdiction over foreign conduct that has an effect on
commerce within the U.S. 15 U.S.C. § 1; U.S. v. Aluminum Co. of America (AL-
COA), 148 F.2d 416, 444 (2d Cir. 1945).
59. See, e.g., Matsushita Electronic Industrial Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475
U.S. 574 (1986).
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losses by selling its product below the market level. The predator hopes
to eventually drive its competition out of the market thus realizing a
monopoly with artificially inflated prices. The predator must also take
into account that its monopoly may be short-lived since new competi-
tors may be quick to enter the market after the monopoly is estab-
lished. For. such scheme to be rational, the "future flow of profits, ap-
propriately discounted, must then exceed the present size of the
losses." 60 One Treasury Department official with considerable an-
tidumping experience stated that he has never come into contact with
any case which he would categorize as predatory dumping."' Further,
in Matsushita Electronic Industrial Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., the
Supreme Court argued that
predatory pricing schemes require conspirators to suffer losses
in order eventually to realize their illegal gains; moreover, the
gains depend on a host of uncertainties, making such schemes
more likely to fail than to succeed. These economic realities
tend to make predatory pricing conspiracies self-deterring
62
In short, profit-seeking foreign producers rarely, if ever, intention-
ally dump their products in the American markets. It is perhaps for
this reason that, neither the 1921 Act nor its 1979 replacement require
proof of predatory intent. In addition, although "meeting competition"
is considered a defense to predatory pricing under the antitrust laws, no
such defense exists under the antidumping laws. Imports can be as-
sessed an antidumping duty even if their U.S. price is consistent with
the price charged by domestic producers for similar merchandise.63
Without the intent requirement or a meeting competition defense, en-
forcement of the antidumping law is merely an exercise in arithmetic.
There is no way a foreign producer can undersell a U.S. producer in
the domestic market unless the volume of its exports is so small that it
60. R. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX 145 (1978).
61. Marks, United States Antidumping Laws: A Government Overview, 43 ANTI-
TRUST L.J. 580, 581 (1974).
62. Id. at 594-95. The Supreme Court reversed the Third Circuit Court of Ap-
peals' grant of summary judgment of the Plaintiffs-U.S. manufacturers' antitrust
claims. The plaintiffs also alleged violation of the Antidumping Act of 1916, which also
required proof of predatory intent. The antidumping claims were dismissed by the Dis-
trict Court. 494 F. Supp. 1190 (E.D. Pa. 1980).
63. Of course, if the U.S. price for foreign goods were higher than the price
charged by domestic producers, it is doubtful that there would be the required "mate-
rial injury" to a U.S. industry.
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cannot "materially injure" the U.S. industry. Thus, the antidumping
law, despite its official purpose, effectively insulates entrenched U.S.
industries from foreign competition. But when the antidumping law is
applied to imports from nonmarket economy countries, the antidump-
ing law combats actual "unfair trade practices." While it may be irra-
tional economic behavior for a profit-motivated producer to engage in
dumping, such conduct may not be irrational for the producer in a
state-controlled economy. Because the economic deterrent to predatory
pricing schemes does not exist in most state-controlled economy coun-
tries, the above analysis of predatory pricing would not apply to these
producers. The state-controlled producer can set a price for goods
shipped to the U.S. at a number lower than the fair market value,
without actually intending to engage in predatory dumping. Con-
versely, the market economy producer must price the product high
enough to realize a profit. Thus, with respect to these nonmarket econo-
mies, the antidumping law protects U.S. industries from having to com-
pete with foreign producers who are not expected to price their prod-
ucts high enough to realize a profit. In this way, the antidumping law
actually does combat unfair trade.
This is not to suggest that state control gives foreign producers an
advantage over U.S. producers. Overall, state controlled economies are
rarely successful in foreign markets. However, if the nation with a
state-controlled economy concentrated its resources on producing a par-
ticular product, it could cause injury to U.S. producers in the same
industry even if the U.S. producers were operating at maximum effi-
ciency. This is one way in which state-controlled economies can distort
international markets. Thus, while most advocates of free trade and
"laissez faire" policies, including former President Ronald Reagan,6 '
generally oppose aggressive enforcement of the antidumping laws, these
free traders should applaud efforts to apply the antidumping laws to
imports from countries where most of the production decisions are, in
fact, controlled by the state.
III. DETERMINING A NONMARKET ECONOMY COUNTRY
In the previous section, this paper concluded that antidumping du-
ties on imports from nonmarket economy countries will often be higher
using the "factors of production" method of calculating foreign market
value than using the home market price method. In addition, there may
be strong policy reasons for enforcing the antidumping laws against
64. Remarks at a White House Meeting with Business and Trade Leaders, PUB.
PAPERS 1985 Vol. II, 1127 (September 23, 1985).
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nonmarket economy nations. Thus, determining whether a country is a
nonmarket economy is crucial.
This section will focus on the statutory and regulatory provisions
that guide the DOC in determining that a country is a nonmarket
economy. It will then review cases where the DOC made such a deter-
mination to explore the economic conditions that existed in certain sec-
tors of the economy as opposed to the national economy. Finally, it will
consider the DOC's likely treatment of reforms in communist countries
as they affect nonmarket economy status under the antidumping law.
A. Statutory Provisions
Section 1316 of the 1988 Act replaced the term "state controlled
economy" with the term "nonmarket economy." This section provides:
The term "nonmarket economy country" means any foreign
country that the administering authority determines does not
operate on market principles of cost or pricing structures, so
that sales of merchandise in such country do not reflect the fair
value of the merchandise.65
It is not clear whether these changes will have any substantive effect on
the operation of the statute. In fact, the term "state-controlled econ-
omy" was never defined in either the previous statute or the regula-
tions. The 1988 Act, however, also set forth the factors to be consid-
ered in determining that a country is a nonmarket economy:
(i) the extent to which the currency of the foreign country is
convertible into the currency of other countries,
(ii) the extent to which wage rates in the foreign country are
determined by free bargaining between labor and management,
(iii) the extent to which joint ventures or other investments by
firms of other foreign countries are permitted in the foreign
country,
(iv) the extent of government ownership or control of the means
of production,
(v) the extent of government control over the allocation of re-
sources and over the price and output decisions of enterprises,
and
(vi) such other factors as the administering authority considers
65. 19 U.S.C. § 1677(18) (1988).
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appropriate. 66
While these enumerated factors provide some guidance, as a practical
matter, they are simply a codification of past DOC practice. Courts
have noted that the DOC has broad authority in administering the an-
tidumping law. 67 Moreover, because the determination that a country is
an nonmarket economy is not subject to judicial review,68 the DOC has
much discretion in making such a determination.69
B. Nonmarket Economy Status Determination by Sectoral or
National Basis?
The DOC's determination is somewhat easier in the case of a
hard-line communist country such as the U.S.S.R., where the central
government makes all major production and investment decisions and
sets wages and prices.7 ° Other communist countries have allowed some
free-market type reforms in sectors of the economy. Importers of goods
from these reformist countries may argue that, while the economy is
generally state controlled, the relevant sector of the economy operates
on market principles. Thus, for purposes of calculating the antidumping
duty, the country should be considered a market economy.
Neither the statute nor the regulations state whether the DOC
must analyze only the relevant sector of the economy or the national
economy to classify a nation as an nonmarket economy. In Carbon
Steel Plate from Romania, 1 the DOC determined that the Romanian
steel market was a product of a state-controlled economy, but did not
base its decision solely on an analysis of the steel market. Instead, it
based its decision on the following factors:
(1) Central governmental authorities make all major pro-
duction and investment decisions. Central authorities also fix
prices and control the activities of enterprises.
(2) Wages are determined by law. All wages and wage
classifications, including those for the steel industry, are clearly
66. 19 U.S.C. § 1677(18)(B) (1988).
67. Smith-Corona Group v. United States, 713 F.2d 1568, 1571 (Fed. Cir. 1983).
68. H. CONF. REP. No. 576, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 591 (1988), reprinted in 1988
U.S. CODE & ADMIN. NEws, 1612, 1624.
69. Once such a determination is made, it remains in effect until revoked. 19
U.S.C. § 1677(18)(C)(i) (1988).
70. See Potassium Chloride From the U.S.S.R., 50 Fed. Reg. 4,562 (1985); Car-
bon Steel Plate From Romania, 47 Fed. Reg. 35,666 (1982).,
71. 47 Fed. Reg. 35,666 (1982).
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spelled out with ceilings for each occupation.
(3) All major investment decisions, including those in the
steel industry, are made by central governmental authorities
and are the basis for implementing projects drawn up at the
ministry level. 72
Based on the cited factors, it appears that the DOC conducted a broad
analysis of the Romanian economy rather than limiting its focus to the
steel industry. Similarly, in Chloropicrin from the Peoples Republic of
China,"7 the DOC stated:
Our determination is not that the PRC chloropicrin is totally
state-controlled. Rather, we have determined that the economy
of the PRC is state-controlled to an extent that sales of such or
similar merchandise in the PRC do not permit a determination
of foreign market value. 4
In Natural Menthol from the People's Republic of China,7 5 the
respondent presented "persuasive evidence" that the purchases and
sales of natural menthol in the PRC were based on market principles.
The DOC still found it to be a state-controlled economy because two of
the major factors in the production of natural menthol, land and labor,
were subject to extensive state regulation. The DOC also noted that
general state planning controls over other agricultural products limited
the autonomy and distorted the incentives of producers. 76 Since all sec-
tors of the economy are inter-dependant, analysis of the economy in
general seems appropriate. But on the other side of this debate, it has
been argued that:
in a nonmarket economy certain products could be sold free of
direct state control (as menthol appeared to be in China), or
could be sold in regions (such as China's special economic
zones) in which the state has indicated it will allow "market
principles" to play a major role in economic decisions.77
Nevertheless, communist countries who want to rid themselves of the
72. Id. at 35,667 (1982).
73. 49 Fed. Reg. 5,982 (1984).
74. Id. at 5,985 (1984).
75. 46 Fed. Reg. 3,258 (1981).
76. Id. at 3,259 (1981).
77. Alford, supra note 2, at 90.
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effects of nonmarket economy status for purposes of U.S. antidumping
duties will have to go further in reforming their entire economies. Lim-
ited reforms in particular sectors of the economy will not suffice.
C. Attempted Reforms in Communist Countries
Reforms instituted in communist countries thus far have received
little approval from the DOC. Perhaps the least state controlled of the
communist countries is Hungary, which instituted market-oriented re-
forms in the 1970s. However, in 1981, the DOC determined that the
Hungarian economy was state-controlled based on a number of fac-
tors.78 The DOC found that the Hungarian government applied a mar-
ginal tax rate ranging from 50% to 100% for wage increases above the
government's acceptable level. Further, the Hungarian currency was
not convertible with "hard currency" countries and the government had
the power to appoint high level enterprise management. The DOC con-
cluded that market-oriented reforms instituted in the Hungarian econ-
omy in 1978 were "uncertain."
Another example of an attempt to introduce market principles to a
sector of a state-controlled economy is the People's Republic of China
(PRC). Since 1984, the PRC has instituted extensive economic reforms
in rural-based industrial enterprises. The DOC addressed these reforms
in the candle industries in Petroleum Wax Candles from the People's
Republic of China.7 9 In that case, the candle factories under investiga-
tion were operated as collectives. The materials used to make the can-
dles were not supplied under a government quota nor were the prices
paid for the inputs set directly by the central government. In addition,
the production levels of the factories were not subject to a quotas or
price controls.
Despite the reforms in the PRC candle industry, two factors led
the DOC to determine that the PRC candle economy was state con-
trolled. First, paraffin wax, the primary ingredient in candles, was pro-
duced by state-owned petroleum firms operating under prices and quo-
tas fixed by the central government. Any wax produced in excess of the
fixed quota could be sold at prices within 20 % of the price set by the
central government. Though the candle producers purchased wax at the
"uncontrolled" prices, the DOC concluded that no market forces had
any effect on the price of paraffin wax. Second, most of the candle
production was sold to state-owned trading companies which were re-
78. Truck Trailer Axle-and-Brake Assemblies From the Hungarian People's Re-
public, 46 Fed. Reg. 46,152 (1981).
79. 51 Fed. Reg. 25,085 (1986).
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quired to surrender their foreign earnings to the Bank of China. Candle
producers were not allowed to receive foreign exchange from their ex-
ports. Licensing requirements and other limitations were imposed on all
imports into the PRC. The DOC concluded that these restrictions
could limit competition by other imports and insulate candle producers
from external market forces."0
The factors relied upon by the DOC in the Petroleum Wax Can-
dles case might apply in a market economy country - including the
United States. For instance, the United States menthol industry is
hardly governed by "the unbridled operation of the supplyand demand
forces." ' The federal government "sets minimum prices for tobacco
and limits the amount that each farmer can grow.""2 In addition, many
imports to the U.S. are subject to licensing requirements and other im-
port restrictions similar to those in the PRC. Ironically, even -the U.S.
antidumping law might be considered a "layer of government" that in-
sulates U.S. producers from the external world market. Nevertheless,
the DOC seems to place more emphasis on these factors in countries
attempting to introduce reforms than in established market economies.
In the Petroleum Wax Candles case, the DOC stated:
While controls in foreign exchange and imports and exports are
not dispositive on the issue of a state control (certain market
economies display many of these characteristics), they are im-
portant criteria to consider in countries that are moving from
highly centralized systems by introducing certain market-like
mechanisms. This is because such controls are traditionally em-
ployed by nonmarket economies to maintain economically irra-
tional prices by protecting [sic] their internal prices from exter-
nal market forces. As a result, we necessarily place more
emphasis on the existence of such controls in countries like the
PRC than we would in countries that are traditionally more
market oriented.8 3
80. Id. at 25,086. The DOC referred to the restrictions on imports and foreign
exchange as a " layer of government [which] creates a buffer between the internal
PRC economy and the external, world market." Id.
81. See Alford, supra note 2, at 103.
82. Richards, Tobacco Price Props Come Under Criticism Even by Growers, Wall
St. J., Apr. 4, 1985, at 1, col. 6. Similar circumstances exist in the American peanut
industry. Some argue that Congress has effectively foreclosed entry into the peanut
industry by newcomers. See Alford, supra note 2, at 108, n.169.
83. 51 Fed. Reg. 25,086 (1986).
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This decision indicates that traditional state-controlled economy
countries attempting to reform their economies will have to overcome a
heavy presumption of nonmarket status before the DOC will use their
home market prices in antidumping investigations. Congress, respond-
ing to pressure from domestic industry, seems determined to prevent
state-controlled economy producers from gaining any competitive ad-
vantage over American producers unless such producers are only sub-
ject to market forces. 8 Thus, while the 1988 Act provided some guid-
ance as to what factors the DOC should examine, past DOC decisions
suggest that in the eyes of the DOC, reform-minded communist coun-
tries will probably have to reform their entire economies before losing
nonmarket economy status. Market-oriented reforms in limited sectors
of the economy only will not suffice. At this point, it is too early to tell
whether Eastern European reforms will go far enough to satisfy the
DOC.
The re-unification of East and West Germany means that former
East German industries are part of a market economy nation. In addi-
tion, Poland has significantly reformed its national economy. In Poland,
"nearly all price controls and subsidies were ended with the stroke of a
pen on January 1 [1990]."85 Poland has also out-paced other Eastern
European nations in encouraging private investment from the West."
While Polish industry is still 95 % state-owned, Poland has adopted
new rules for creating private companies from state-owned enterprises.
For example, the Polish government has announced plans to sell the
Gdansk shipyard, the birthplace of the Solidarity trade union, to work-
ers and the public. 87 Due to a lack of domestic capital, however, only
five out of over 8,000 state-owned enterprises were sold in 1990.8
84. Prior to enactment of the 1988 Act, several bills were introduced by Senator
John Heinz (R-Pa.) attempting to address the problem of applying the antidumping
laws to nonmarket economy nations. A few of these bills proposed that nonmarket
economy goods not be considered to be sold below fair value if sold in the U.S. at or
above the lowest average price charged in the U.S. market by any market economy
producer who was selling at or above fair value. See S. 1966, 96th Cong., 1st Sess., 125
CONG. REc. 30,670 (1979); S. 958, 97th Cong., 1st Sess., 127 CONG. REC. 7088
(1981). Supporters of domestic industries competing with imports attacked the bill as
condoning nonmarket economy dumping.
85. Wash. Post, April 11, 1990, at A18, col. 1.
86. See Newman, Gold Rush: Capitalists Jam Poland Asking Which Way to the
Biggest Deals, Wall St. J., April 11, 1990, at Al, col. 1.
87. Id. at All, cols. 3-4.
88. Harden, East Europe's Effort to Sell State Fims Off to Slow Start, Wash.
Post, February 12, 1991, at Cl, cols. 2-3 [hereinafter Harden]. Poland has succeeded
in privatizing approximately half of its small shops and buisnesses. Id. at Cl., Col. 3.
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Poland's "shock therapy" approach to reform has been suggested
in the Soviet Union. But the fear of high unemployment, something
new in Soviet society, will probably force the Kremlin to "adopt a more
cautious, stage-by-stage approach" with "gradual price reform.""
Other Eastern European countries use various approaches. In Hungary,
the new prime minister, Jozef Antall, has pledged to reduce state own-
ership of enterprises from 90% to 30% within three years. This effort,
however, is off to a slow start, as only 130 out of 2,300 "salable" enter-
prises were privatized in 1990.90 Antall appears willing to accept large-
scale unemployment as "an unavoidable consequence of a shift to a free
market."9 In addition, joint ventures between U.S. firms and Hungary
appear to be on the rise.
In Czechoslovakia, economic reforms have been introduced at a
"snail's pace. "92 The major dispute in Prague is over the freeing of
prices on basic consumer goods. President Vaclav Havel advocates
gradually releasing price controls over the next two to three years. As
in the U.S.S.R., the government fears the impact of sudden market
reforms on unemployment, inflation and the general dislocation of
workers.93
Under DOC's national economy approach, only Poland appears to
be making sufficiently comprehensive reforms to its national economy
to rid itself of nonmarket economy status in antidumping investiga-
tions. Moreover, even Poland's efforts to privatize industry have stalled.
Accordingly, determination of a nonmarket economy should be based
on a more lenient approach. Sector analysis, as opposed to national
economy analysis, would probably allow more exports from Eastern
European countries to enter the U.S. market without the burden of
high antidumping duties. Moreover, it would still achieve the objective
of combatting unfair trade. Sector analysis would encourage commu-
nist countries to make reforms in certain areas of the economy gradu-
ally without the troubles caused by sudden shifts in a national econ-
omy. This more lenient approach might even accelerate the revival of
89. Id. Radical economic reform has received less public support in the U.S.S.R.
than in other Eastern European nations.
90. Harden, supra note 88, at Cl, Col. 3.
91. Harden, 'Hungarian-ness' Back in Fashion, Nationalist Appeal Brought
Sweeping Election Victory, Wash. Post, April 11, 1990, at A16, col. 2.
92. Randal, Slowness of Economic Change Threatens a Rift in Prague: Some
Fear Consequences of Market Forces, Wash. Post, April 11, 1990, at A19, col. 5.
93. Id. According to the Washington Post, "Czechoslavakia recently scored a
smashing success in its first auction of restaurants and small stores. It plans to sell
more than 100,000 small businesses [in 1991]." Harden, supra note 88, at Cl, col. 3.
TREATMENT OF NONMARKET IMPORTS
Eastern European economies, a result consistent with the Bush Admin-
istration's policy of encouraging perestroika.
IV. CONCLUSION
The 1988 Act codifies prior DOC practices, by forcing the DOC to
use the factors of production method as a first resort in determining
foreign market values for nonmarket economy nations. Use of the fac-
tors of production method will probably result in higher antidumping
duties for imports from nonmarket economy nations. High duties se-
verely limit, if not negate, access to U.S. markets, especially for goods
from communist countries where there is a perception of poor quality.
While antidumping law is generally attacked as being protectionist, as
it is applied to nonmarket economy nations, it combats "unfair trade
practice." Accordingly, the antidumping law should be aggressively en-
forced against imports from nonmarket economies where the producer
is, in fact, controlled by the state.
Due to the statute's harsh treatment of nonmarket economy na-
tions, a determination of nonmarket economy status is critical to re-
form-minded Eastern European nations. The 1988 Act set forth several
factors defining a nonmarket economy, but these factors only codify
existing practice. Most probably, the DOC will still require market
forces throughout the national economy, as opposed to the relevant sec-
tor. This means that Eastern European has to be broad-based. To date,
only Poland appears to be making significant advances toward re-
forming the economy on a national scale. However, the other countries
appear to be headed in the right direction. To assist these countries in
trade with the U.S., the DOC should adopt sector analysis in determin-
ing nonmarket economy status. Sector analysis still achieves the goal of
combatting unfair trade where the imports are produced in a state-con-
trolled sector, yet allows some imports from Eastern Europe entry into
the U.S. market. This may provide additional incentives to reform sec-
tors of the economies and accelerate the revival of these economies.
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